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Abstract:  
Purpose  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the average costs and rates of fraud. It 
investigates the usability of greater use of more accurate measurement which if monitored 
and repeated can secure minimizations which could amount to a new market advantage, in 
this paper we aim to describe the characteristics of perpetrators of occupational fraud and 
their effects on organizations. 
Design/methodology/approach 
This paper has analyzed 420 fraud risk measurement exercises from 25 countries in a 
range of different sectors. The study is based on a telecommunication analysis fraud survey 
conducted by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) using a multivariate 
regression analysis to explain the effect of perpetrators’ characteristics on fraud losses. 
Eliminating those which doesn’t assess a statistically valid sample which indicates the 
presence of fraud, error or correctness in each case within that sample; have been completed 
and reported; have been externally validated and have a measurable level of accuracy were 
included. Gathering the percentage loss rate (PLR) and the fraud frequency rate (FFR) and 
analyze these values using Excel to determine average rates and further comparable data. 
Findings  
 Fraud and error losses in an organization should currently be expected to be at least 
2.74 per cent, probably more than 4.94 per cent and possibly more than 9 per cent. The PLR 
when first measured has been found to be 5.22 per cent and 4.65 per cent when last measured. 
Only the perpetrator’s position and collusion are statistically significant when controlling for 
the potential correlation among explanatory factors. 
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Introduction: 
Through today’s world of business with a smaller budgets and higher competitive 
markets organizations are looking for new ways to reduce costs. A lot have been pursued; to 
achieve what is often described as “competitive advantage” (Porter, 2004; Briggs and 
Edwards, 2006). Investing in measures to counter fraud is one measure which is newly 
investigated by the vast majority of organizations to achieve this aim. Occupational fraud has 
enormous consequences for the victim organization, its employees, creditors, investors, and 
for society at large. It may lead to reduced salaries and benefits for the organization’s 
employees, the loss of jobs or job opportunities, investment losses, lower sales volume due to 
an organization’s tarnished reputation, an increase in sales prices, change of ownership, 
bankruptcy or even the liquidation of assets. In sum, it reduces the victim organization’s 
competitiveness in the global economy. For example, if we assume a 3 percent net profit 
margin on sales, a store would have to sell the equivalent of $1,216.66 in additional 
merchandise just to compensate for the loss associated with the theft of a single $0.10 candy 
per day (Mishra and Prasad, 2006). Occupational fraud may also generate other indirect costs 
for employees and investors in the victim organization, such as pain and suffering, mental 
health treatment and a lower quality of life (Payne and Gainey, 2004). Introducing the 
appropriate strategies to measure fraud and then counter it effectively can reduce it, which in 
organizations with substantial budgets a few percentage points reduction in fraud losses can 
reap substantial financial returns, as will be shown later in this paper. In the public sector this 
could be released for greater resources for services or avert cuts in budgets and in the private 
sector, provide the source of competitive advantage. 
This paper will start by examining the broad challenges of measuring crime in general 
and fraud in-particular based on a survey data owned by the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (ACFE). The survey was distributed to members of the ACFE in March 2006. 
Each survey respondent was asked for detailed information about his or her largest 
investigation which met the following four criteria: 
1. The case involved occupational fraud; 
2. The case was investigated after January 2004; 
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3. The investigation was completed; 
4. The ACFE member was reasonably sure the perpetrator had been identified. 
It will then move on to set out the methodology used for this paper. This study also 
contributes to academia by measuring the statistical effect of perpetrators’ characteristics on 
fraud losses while controlling for the potential correlation among these characteristics. Before 
setting out the results, the paper will briefly describe the effect of fraud on organizations then 
examine professional approaches to countering fraud, highlighting the importance of accurate 
measurement and some of the guidance and debate surrounding it. The paper will then 
present the key findings from the assessment of fraud risk measurement exercises before 
concluding on the key issues and areas for further research. 
Main Text: 
 The measurement of crimes and fraud Crimes in general pose challenges in 
measurement which evoke debates over the merits of different methods used to gauge them 
which results in variation in evaluating the loss values. Generally the recorded crime statistics 
are criticized as not been accurate because of the attrition from non-reports and reports which 
are not recorded in the statistics (Maguire, 2007). The British Crime Survey is generally seen 
as more accurate because it is based upon a large statistically valid sample of the British 
population and records their experience of crime victimization (Maguire, 2007). The situation 
with fraud is even more contested (Hoare, 2007; Levi et al., 2007). Until 2006 and the 
passage of the Fraud Act there was no codified set of offences in England and Wales (Farrell 
et al., 2007). There has (and still is) much more debate over what constitutes fraud (Doig, 
2006)- this results in variation in Fraud loss readings as shown in the table below. 
 
Distribution of fraud losses 
This variation in the Fraud loss ranges results from variations in the degree of 
authority and financial control exercised at different job levels. For example, managers, top 
executives and owners have greater access to company funds, assets, and confidential 
information than lower level employees (Wells, 2008; KPMG, 2009). Within organizations, 
the hierarchical position may either limit or facilitate certain types of fraud (Holtfreter, 
European Scientific Journal    November edition vol. 8, No.25   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
31 
 
2005).Many organizations and individuals are reluctant to report frauds and many also pursue 
it through the civil courts (Higson, 1999; Button et al., 2009). 
 Many frauds are undiscovered and therefore hidden from official returns. This means 
recorded statistics of fraud presented by the police and related bodies only capture the tip of 
the iceberg and therefore the most accurate measures are fraud risk measurement exercises. 
The central premise of this approach is that within 
a total number of transactions there will be a 
number of fraudulent and mistaken cases which 
have not been discovered. 
 Consider the Investigation process as a 
circle, at the core are the small number of 
detected cases of error which the organization 
knows about. Above that are the cases of error the 
organization does not know about and at the outer 
shell is the vast majority of cases which are not fraud or error. The fraud risk measurement 
exercise focuses upon a specific area of activity, such as procurement, staff payrolls, expense 
claims to name some. Statistically valid sample is then reviewed and from this they are 
usually classified as fraudulent, an error or acceptable.  
 The important difference in this type of measurement is that by assessing a range of 
transactions in greater detail, those undertaking the review are able to discover a sample of 
cases of fraud and error which otherwise would not have been discovered. From this it is then 
possible to extrapolate on the actual levels of fraud (to a specific statistical confidence level). 
To return to the shape in Figure 1 the aim is to uncover the size of the inner two tiers of the 
circle. It is this latter type of measurement which will be the focus of this paper. 
Methodology 
This paper covers different types of expenditure totaling almost $800 billion, in 44 
organizations from 25 countries. The value of the expenditure examined has not been uprated 
to 2009 values. The paper has excluded figures resulting from surveys of opinion and some 
loss measurement exercises where it is clear that they have not met the standards described 
below. It has included exercises which have considered a statistically valid sample of income 
or expenditure –based on the International rules of fair Operational statistics (KPMG, 2009)  : 
1. Which have sought and examined information indicating the presence of fraud, error 
or correctness in each case within that sample; 
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2. Which have been completed and reported; 
3. Which have been externally validated; 
4. Which have a measurable level of statistical confidence; 
5. Which have a measurable level of accuracy. 
 Some of the exercises have resulted in estimates of the fraud frequency rate (FFR), 
some of the percentage of expenditure lost to fraud, and some have measured both. 
 To avoid skewing the overall results by including a disproportionate quantity of data 
from one source, only the results from the first and most recent exercises have been included. 
In most of these instances, fraud and error losses have been significantly reduced since the 
initial measurement exercises. Sometimes, once such exercises have been completed, the 
organizations concerned have, mistakenly in the view of the authors of this paper, decided not 
to publish their results. In some cases, those directly involved in countering fraud have 
decided, confidentially, to provide this information for wider consideration. it is important to 
emphasize that this research will never be complete. More evidence becomes available each 
year. However, the preponderance of the evidence does point clearly in one direction, as is 
explained later. While it is necessary to make these caveats clear, the importance of the 
evidence collated in this paper should not be underestimated. The evidence shows fraud and 
error losses can be measured – when they have been successfully measured so many times, in 
respect of so many different types of expenditure, in many different organizations and across 
the world, to assert otherwise is the modern day equivalent of arguing that the world is flat! 
However, even more important is that the evidence shows that losses to fraud and error 
represent a significant, damaging and, crucially, unnecessary business cost. 
Countering fraud: a professional approach 
Organizational responses to fraud vary significantly from sector to sector and country to 
country. Generally in most areas of commerce the commitment to countering fraud is not 
high enough. For example, a study of UK FTSE 100 companies found a significant number 
of those surveyed (ten of 32) did not have a counter fraud strategy. Other surveys have also 
highlighted gaps in organizations’ strategies to counter fraud (Bussmann and Werle, 2007; 
Fraud Review Team, 2006; Ernst & Young, 2006) and some of the most common issues 
include: 
1.  Reluctance to accurately measure the size of the problem; 
2.  A reluctance to report cases of fraud when they are discovered; 
3. The lack of a counter fraud strategy which includes the key areas expected; 
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4.  Lack of resources to counter the problem; 
5. Lack of capacity of staff to counter fraud. 
 While there has not hitherto been any legal requirement, there is a growing 
understanding that the key to successful loss reduction is to understand the nature and scale 
of the problem. For example, in Europe, the European healthcare fraud and corruption 
declaration of 2004, agreed by organizations from 28 countries states that: 
 The development of a European common standard of risk measurement, with annual 
statistically valid follow up exercises to measure progress in reducing losses to fraud and 
corruption throughout the EU (European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption Network, 2004). 
 The range of types of income and expenditure where losses have been measured 
include Payroll, procurement, housing, education, social security, healthcare, insurance, tax 
credits, pensions, transport, and construction. Two types of figures have been produced: 
1. Percentage loss rate (PLR, i.e. the proportion of expenditure lost to fraud and error). 
2. FFR (i.e. frequency of fraud and error). 
 The same exercise can produce different PLR and FFR figures. This is because the 
items of expenditure where fraud is found to be present may be either greater or lesser than 
the average value of all of the items of expenditure. For example, it may be that fraud tends to 
affect items of expenditure that are higher than the average value – this will result in the PLR 
being higher than the FFR. Indeed, to some extent the findings of this research, in general, 
show just that. An analysis of the figures has also been produced for where losses in the same 
area of expenditure have been measured and re-measured. This outlines: 
1. The level of losses when first measured and the level of losses when last measured 
after efforts to reduce them. 
2. sector-based analysis shows: 
a. The level of losses in key sectors where the most data exists healthcare and 
social security. 
Fraud and error losses 
It would now seem appropriate to explore some of the findings from the analysis of 
the fraud measurement exercises studied, this time the target will be communication 
companies,  
 The types and severity of fraud attacks will primarily revolve around the market 
environment the CSP is operating within and will relate to the range of products and services 
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being offered or planned for. CSPs have business plans in place to determine the innovative 
products they will provide to the respective customer segments (corporate, business and 
residential). The criminal fraternity are also actively determining their own “business 
strategy‟ for defrauding what is provided. 
 The first area is the PLR. The exercises found the PLR was found to be between 0.13 
and 10.60 per cent with an average PLR of 4.57 per cent as shown in Figure 2. To further 
analyze this we will break this down into exercises showing less than 3, 3-8 and over 8 per 
cent. As Figure 2 shows 66 per cent of the exercises showed PLR figures of more than 3 per 
cent with almost 19 per cent with a PLR over 8 per cent. 
 
The next criteria assessed were the FFR. The range of FFR was found to be between 
0.47 and 9.6 per cent with an average FFR of 4.28 per cent as shown in Figure 3. There was a 
much more common grouping on this criterion with 90 per cent of exercises assessed 
recording an FFR of 3-8 per cent, only 1.67 per cent over 8 per cent. Given the dominance of 
the 3-8 per cent this may suggest that a fraud and error rate of between 3 and 8 per cent is the 
norm. 
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 A significant finding was that organizations that repeated the fraud measurement 
exercises tended to a show a reduction in the PLR. The average PLR when first measured has 
been found to be 5.40 per cent; the average PLR when last measured was found to be 4.61 per 
cent . This represents an average reduction of just fewer than 15 per cent. Which means once 
an organization discovers an accurate measure of fraud losses this acts as an incentive and 
spur to introduce measures to reduce fraud losses. It also shows fraud can be reduced and that 
in many organizations a saving of 15 per cent fraud losses would amount to a significant sum 
of money. 
 On the basis of the evidence, it is clear that fraud and error losses in any organization 
should currently be expected to be at least 3 per cent, probably more than 5 per cent and 
possibly more than 9 per cent. However, it would be wrong to go too much further in terms of 
predicting where in this range, losses for each type of expenditure measured, will be. This is 
because, other than in respect of healthcare and social security, the volume of data does not 
warrant this. Also, each organization will have either relatively stronger or relatively weaker 
counter fraud arrangements. This factor will affect where within the range of expected losses, 
a particular organization will find itself. The authors intend to publish further research 
assessing the effectiveness of organizations to counter fraud based upon 28 key aspects of a 
counter fraud strategy as advocated by the CIPFA guidance. 
Factors of Anti-Fraud Measures: 
 What needs to be considered is that fraud can result from failures within technology, 
the method used to deploy and deliver services or through organizational and procedural 
weaknesses. However, these very same areas of concern should also be the key elements for 
formulating the defense mechanisms as there is no single solution to the fraud problem. What 
is needed is a balanced approach that takes into consideration Technology, People and 
Processes working together to create an effective Fraud Strategy. The purpose of a Fraud 
Strategy is to ensure an appropriate mix of people, processes and tools are in place, supported 
by Executive Level Management. This will enable effective defense mechanisms to be 
deployed in the right places at the right time. Based on Presidium’s extensive international 
experience of assessing the fraud risk across all technologies in CSPs ranging from Tier 1 to 
Tier 3, there is still a degree of uncertainty with regard to what exactly constitutes fraudulent 
behavior. This position reflects largely on the areas Fraud Teams are asked to focus on, their 
overall remit and areas of responsibility and on the level of authority they have to act in the 
best interests of the business. These considerations differ greatly from CSP to CSP and even 
considering different Telecoms Group approaches to managing fraud – there is no definitive 
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right or wrong way. CSPs will not find a defined template or an all-encompassing industry 
model. There is definitely not a „one size fits all‟ model for fraud management. 
 Another crucial factor is Education since employment opportunities may depend on 
education requirements, the education level of the perpetrator (i.e. high school diploma, some 
college education or a university degree) may play an important role in increasing fraud 
losses (Holtfreter, 2005, 2008). A higher education level may also provide a greater technical 
ability to perpetrate sophisticated fraud schemes (ACFE, 2010). While education level is 
positively associated with moral development (i.e. the ability to discriminate between right 
and wrong), a business degree may in fact reduce moral development by increasing self-
interested behaviors, thus encouraging unethical practices (Zahra et al., 2007). The table 
below examines the effect of the perpetrator’s education on fraud losses. The results indicate 
that perpetrators with the highest education level (i.e. a university degree) commit the largest 
frauds, with a median loss of C$1,000,000 and a mean loss of C$2,003,085.  
 
 However, the table below also shows a significant positive correlation between 
holding the position of executive/owner and having a university degree. The multivariate 
analyses shown in a later section of this paper will control for the correlation between the 
perpetrator’s position and education level. 
 
 One last factor that is found through this paper investigation is Multivariate analyses 
In which multivariate regression analysis is used to study the effect of the perpetrator’s 
position and the effect of collusion on total occupational fraud losses. In this regression 
analysis, we also employ the victim organization’s annual sales as an additional independent 
variable to control for the potential effect of size on total fraud losses. Because of the large 
range of values in the total fraud loss and the annual sales variables, we use the natural log 
transformation of these two variables to reduce the range of values and attenuate the effect of 
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outliers on the regression results. The table below shows that the perpetrator’s position 
(especially when he/she is an executive or owner) and collusion are significantly associated 
with occupational fraud losses. A higher job level and the presence of collusion tend to 
increase occupational fraud losses. The model’s explanatory power is rather high for these 
explanatory models. In fact, 33 percent of the variation in occupational fraud losses is 
explained by the variation in the explanatory variables included in the model. 
 
 Most organizations do not undertake regular fraud risk measurement exercises 
(Brooks et al., 2009). There are therefore lots of bodies who do not know the true extent of 
their fraud losses. This means there is expenditure been made which does not need to be, 
which if discovered and dealt with could be released for other services or provide greater 
profitability. If organizations accurately measure the costs of fraud and error on a regular 
basis it clearly incentivizes an organization to manage that cost, like any other cost. Fraud 
and error are clearly problems that any organization would want to reduce. Therefore, the 
papers finding that those who do regularly measure fraud tend to show a reduction in it is not 
surprising. Accurately measuring fraud and error clearly provides a basis for reaping a 
competitive advantage. 
Anti-Fraud Management: 
 Once we were able to measure fraud and errors clearly a management process should 
be used; to effectively manage fraud and underpin the implementation of an effective 
strategy, there are 3 key elements that must be aligned – the people employed to detect and 
prevent fraud, developing clearly defined processes and the use of effective technology. By 
combining these elements into their fraud management requirements CSPs will have an 
ability and realistic opportunity to win the battle. 
 People: recruiting experienced fraud personnel can be a difficult task, especially in 
countries where fraud functions are relatively new areas. 
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Process: processes must be defined initially at a strategic level to demonstrate the key 
stages of detecting, managing and preventing fraud. 
 Tools: to be effective, the Fraud Management System (FMS) has to be used in 
conjunction with Fraud Analysts that have sufficient skills to understand the FMS output. 
Benefits of a Fraud Management System:  
 Effective fraud management is not only about detecting and preventing fraud, it’s also 
about being able to sell, educate, report and promote the requirement for it throughout the 
business, plus with it you can ensure Automation, Volume and Quality of Data, Flexibility, 
Dashboard and Case Management. 
 However, the system is an overhead to the business like any other department and 
includes:  
1.  Cost of resources 
2.  Cost of technology. 
3. Cost of time and resources of other business supporting areas. 
 The Fraud Team needs to be seen as the in-house experts on fraud management and 
by taking this approach, support and appreciation of the Fraud Team will increase. This can 
be achieved by: 
1.  Selling the concept of fraud from the ‘top down’ – promoting the key benefits and 
attributes of the Fraud Team  
2. By aligning the fraud strategy and objectives with those of the company – common 
goals and objectives  
3. Educating the business on the role the Fraud Team plays – raising the levels of 
awareness including successes and where relevant stumbling blocks. 
4. Effective management reporting of the facts and figures – ensuring visibility 
especially of high impact or organized fraud attacks. 
5. Measuring the success of the department - KPIs to maximize productivity. 
6. Being recognized as Subject Matter Experts in Fraud Management – open door 
approach  
Conclusion: 
 The accurate measurement of losses has been considered either impossible or too 
difficult. It proves that this is wrong. Losses to fraud and error can now be treated as a 
business cost like any other – to be tracked and reduced. It is also the case that works to 
measure losses can be highly cost effective. The extent to which efforts to reduce losses are 
helped by greater knowledge about the problem is shown by the significantly lower (15 per 
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cent) average level of losses where they have been re-measured over a period of time, in the 
same area of expenditure. 
 There are a number of key findings which emerge from this research. First, losses to 
fraud and error can be measured – and cost effectively. Second, on the basis of the evidence it 
is likely that losses in any organization and any area of expenditure will be at least 3 per cent, 
probably more than 5 per cent and possibly more than 9 per cent. 
 The battle against fraudsters will never be won due to the fast moving industrial 
environment and the drive to launch more complex products and services quickly to attract 
market share and maintain a competitive advantage. 
 Our results should encourage organizations to reinforce their internal controls at the 
upper job levels to minimize fraud risks and losses. Designing and implementing controls 
which mitigate the risk of collusion to reduce the increased losses that normally result from 
such frauds is essential for organizations. Future research efforts should also examine the 
effectiveness of anti-fraud controls, especially in the context that such controls may be 
interrelated. Most prior research analyzes anti-fraud controls in isolation, not controlling for 
their possible correlation, yet some internal controls may be more expensive to implement 
than others. Organizations would benefit from understanding more about the relative 
effectiveness of various anti-fraud controls. 
 Finally, with the benefit of accurate information about their nature and extent, fraud 
and error can be reduced significantly. In a troubled economic climate, not to consider the 
financial benefits of making relatively painless reductions in losses to fraud and error seems 
rather foolhardy. Fraud should be treated like any other cost a holistic approach introduced to 
counter it and this can reap financial benefits which in some sectors could amount to a new 
competitive advantage. 
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